Significant Victories: The Practice and Promise of First Contracts in the Public and Private Sectors by Juravich, Tom et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Research Studies and Reports ILR Collection 
10-11-2002 
Significant Victories: The Practice and Promise of First Contracts 
in the Public and Private Sectors 
Tom Juravich 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst 
Kate Bronfenbrenner 
Cornell University, klb23@cornell.edu 
Robert Hickey 
Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Research Studies and Reports by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. 
For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Significant Victories: The Practice and Promise of First Contracts in the Public 
and Private Sectors 
Abstract 
After decades of massive employment losses in heavily unionized sectors of the economy, and the 
exponential growth of the largely unorganized service sector, the American labor movement is struggling 
to remain relevant. Despite new organizing initiatives, the combination of US labor law and labor relations 
practices have made new organizing a tremendously arduous endeavor. Private sector workers, in 
particular, are routinely confronted with a host of aggressive legal, marginally legal, and illegal anti-union 
tactics from employers and their representatives. 
Keywords 
collective bargaining, report, employment, loss, union, American, labor, movement, U.S., law, legal, 
employer, representative, illegal, private, sector, ILR, Cornell University 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Juravich, T., Bronfenbrenner, K., & Hickey, R. (2002, October). Significant victories: The practice and 
promise of first contracts in the public and private sectors [Electronic version]. Paper presented at the 
AFL-CIO/Michigan State University Conference on Worker Rights, Lansing, MI. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/2/ 
Required Publishers Statement 
Copyright held by the author. 
Final paper published as Juravich, T., Bronfenbrenner, K., & Hickey, R. (2006). Significant victories. In R. N. 
Block, S. Friedman, M. Kaminski, & A. Levin (Eds.), Perspectives on the erosion of collective bargaining in 
the United States. Kalamazoo: W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/reports/2 
  
 
 
 
SIGNIFICANT VICTORIES: 
The Practice and Promise of First Contracts 
in the Public and Private Sectors1  
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the 
 
AFL-CIO/Michigan State University Conference on Worker Rights, Lansing, Michigan 
 
October 11-12, 2002 
 
 
 
Tom Juravich 
Professor and Director  
Labor Center  
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
 
 
Kate Bronfenbrenner 
Director of Labor Education Research 
New York State School of Industrial Relations 
Cornell University 
 
 
Robert Hickey 
New York State School of Industrial Relations 
Cornell University 
 
 
                                                 
1 Funding for this project was provided by the AFL-CIO.  The authors would like to thank Ian Campbell, 
Chad Apaliski, David Turner, and Robert Glase for research assistance.  We would also like to 
acknowledge the editorial assistance of Beth Berry. 
 After decades of massive employment losses in heavily unionized sectors of the 
economy, and the exponential growth of the largely unorganized service sector, the 
American labor movement is struggling to remain relevant.  Despite new organizing 
initiatives, the combination of US labor law and labor relations practices have made new 
organizing a tremendously arduous endeavor.  Private sector workers, in particular, are 
routinely confronted with a host of aggressive legal, marginally legal, and illegal anti-
union tactics from employers and their representatives.   
This egregious opposition to unions does not stop once the election is won, but 
continues throughout the first contract bargaining process.  With first contract rates 
averaging less than 75 percent, unions all too often have had to watch organizing 
victories turn into devastating first contract defeats.  Unlike the organizing process, where 
the law can force even the most recalcitrant employer into an election, little in the law 
compels employers to negotiate an agreement.  
Yet, despite these overwhelming obstacles, workers still organize and win – not 
just union elections but first contracts as well.  Each year unions negotiate thousands of 
these first contracts in the US, providing union representation for more than one hundred 
thousand new workers.  What do workers and their unions achieve in these first 
contracts?  Why, when confronted with such powerful opposition, do unorganized 
workers continue to want to belong to unions and newly organized workers want to stay 
union?  What do these first contracts provide that makes the struggle worthwhile?  
To answer these questions, we evaluate first contracts across four dimensions.  
First, we inventory the basic workers’ rights provided by these contracts that go beyond 
the very limited rights provided by federal and state labor law under the “employment at 
will” system in which unorganized workers operate.  But union contracts do more than 
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simply provide abstract rights.  As our second dimension we evaluate how first contracts 
provide workers and their unions with the institutional power to shape work and the labor 
process on a day-to-day basis, substituting fairness and due process for unilateral 
employer power and control.  Third, we explore how first contracts codify the presence 
and power of unions into daily work life, evaluating which institutional arrangements 
provide a meaningful role for workers and their unions in the operation of their 
workplaces.  Fourth, we examine the kinds of workers’ benefits that are both codified and 
supplemented in first contracts, gaining important insights into what kinds of human 
resource practices exist in newly organized unionized workplaces.  Finally, in the 
conclusion, we confront the limitations of what first contracts have been able to achieve 
in the current organizing environment and what it would take for unions to significantly 
increase bargaining power and improve bargaining outcomes in the first contract process. 
 
Previous Research on First Contracts 
 There is a growing body of literature on organizing in both the private and public 
sectors (Bronfenbrenner and Friedman et al., 1998; Bronfenbrenner, 1997a; 
Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2002; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1998; Milkman, 2000; 
Voss and Sherman, 2000).  Some of this research also extends to examining the dynamics 
of first contract campaigns (Bronfenbrenner, 1994, 1996, 2001; Hickey, 2002).   
Collective bargaining agreements are regularly evaluated for patterns, outcomes, and 
emerging basic contract language, yet none of this work distinguishes between first 
contracts and subsequent agreements (BNA, 1995; Kumar, 1989).  A series of studies 
evaluate the financial impact of unionization and first contracts on employers (Lee and 
DiNardo, 2002; Freeman, 1981).  While not directly focusing on first contracts, the AFL-
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CIO regularly gathers data on the wage differential between the union and non-union 
sectors of the economy (AFL-CIO, 2002).    
It is inadequate, however, to focus only on the financial rewards of unionization.  
Non-financial issues such as dignity, fairness, and workplace control are often the key 
issues in organizing campaigns and remain central in the development of initial union 
contracts (Bronfenbrenner, 1996; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2002).  In a comparison of 
firms that faced union organizing drives versus firms at which no such drive took place, 
Richard Freeman and Morris Kleiner found only moderate wage gains through 
unionization, but suggest that “newly organized workers made significant gains in the 
areas of grievance procedures, job posting and bidding, and seniority protection” 
(Freeman and Kleiner, 1990: S8).  To date, however, there is no detailed quantitative 
assessment of these non-financial, yet crucially important, aspects of first agreements. 
 
Methods 
 This research is based on content analysis of 175 first contract agreements in the 
private and public sectors.  The first contracts used in this analysis were collected as part 
of two earlier surveys of private sector organizing and first contract campaigns conducted 
by Bronfenbrenner and another study of public sector organizing campaigns conducted 
by Juravich and Bronfenbrenner. 2  For all 175 first contracts, we evaluated each contract 
along 296 parameters, measuring the extent and nature of various contract provisions.   
                                                 
2 The 55 contracts in the first private sector study were based on the 119 elections and 80 first contracts 
won in a random sample of 261 organizing campaigns that took place between July 1986 and June 1987 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1996).  The 39 contracts collected in the second private sector study were based on a 
survey of the 169 elections and voluntary recognitions and 66 first contracts won from a random sample of 
525 NLRB organizing campaigns that took place from 1993 to 1995 (Bronfenbrenner, 1997b).  The 81 
contracts collected in the third study were based on the 149 election and 129 first contracts won from a 
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 Table 1 provides baseline information on our sample.  The first contracts in our 
sample are almost equally divided between the private sector (54 percent) and public 
sector (46 percent) and cover a total of 27,651 workers, including 11,453 private sector 
and 16,198 public sector workers.  The vast majority of all contracts (82 percent) were 
negotiated and signed on a local level with an average duration of more than two years.  
Unit scope varied widely, with approximately one third of the agreements (36 
percent) covering all full-time and part-time employees and 14 percent covering all 
employees.  Only 3 percent of the agreements covered temporary or per diem workers 
along with part-time workers.  The primary private sector industries represented included 
manufacturing (32 percent) and health care (31 percent).  Not surprisingly, blue-collar 
units represented the largest proportion (39 percent) of the contracts, followed by service 
and maintenance units (20 percent), wall-to-wall units (16 percent), and white collar and 
professional/technical units (11 percent).  In the public sector the contracts were highly 
concentrated among professional/technical workers and service and maintenance workers 
in public schools and state colleges and universities (53 percent) and blue collar, white 
collar, and service and maintenance workers in city and county units (44 percent). 
Given that the contracts in our sample are primarily based in industries and units 
where women and workers of color are concentrated, it is not surprising that they 
represent the majority of the workers covered under these agreements.  Women 
especially dominate in the public sector, where they average 67 percent of the unit 
compared to 38 percent in the private sector.  Workers of color are more concentrated in 
                                                                                                                                                 
random sample of 250 state and local certification elections in 1991 and 1992 (Juravich and 
Bronfenbrenner, 1998). 
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private sector units, where nearly half (47 percent) had at least 50 percent workers of 
color.  In 24 percent of our sample, at least a quarter of the unit worked part time. 
 
Beyond Employment at Will 
Table 2 summarizes the basic workplace rights provided for in first contracts.  
Three quarters (73 percent) of the contracts in our sample contained a discrimination 
clause and approximately two thirds of the contracts in our sample included protections 
against a variety of types of discrimination including race (70 percent), gender (70 
percent), national origin (67 percent), religion (66 percent), age (64 percent), and 
disability (53 percent).  Of the units with at least 25 percent women, 63 percent had 
gender discrimination language and 73 percent of the units with at least 25 percent 
workers of color had language covering race discrimination.  Contractual provisions that 
cover other types of discrimination such as sexual orientation (18 percent), political 
affiliation (22 percent), and veteran status (15 percent) were less common.  The lowest 
percentages were for separate sexual harassment (6 percent) and pay equity (1 percent) 
language.  Although both of these areas are technically covered by gender discrimination 
language, they are most effective when they are specifically dealt with in separate 
contract clauses.  The lack of sexual harassment and pay equity language is particularly 
striking given that the majority of workers covered under these contracts are women. 
Most of these protections are already “guaranteed” by federal and state 
legislation.  Yet, the importance of contractual anti-discrimination language cannot be 
understated.  Not only does it put the employer, union members, and the broader 
community on notice that the union is concerned about these issues, but equally 
important it provides an enforcement mechanism that involves significantly less effort, 
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cost, and time than it does to file claims under state or federal law.  While most grievance 
and arbitration decisions are resolved in several months, government discrimination 
claims can take years, particularly in the current political climate. 
 For nearly all the most common anti-discrimination protections, such as gender, 
race, national origin, religion, and veteran status, the percentage of public sector contracts 
including these protections was 10 percent to 20 percent lower than the private sector 
contracts.  Overall, 41 percent of public sector contracts did not provide any of the 
protections against discrimination covered in Table 2, compared to only 15 percent of the 
private sector contracts.  One possible explanation for this difference is that public sector 
workers are more likely to be covered by state and local discrimination laws, providing 
them a more accessible and possibly less costly and time-consuming process for filing 
anti-discrimination suits than filing through federal protections.  Also, because public 
sector unions are faced with much less employer opposition than their private sector 
counter parts (Juravich and Bronfenbrenner, 1998), they tend to run much weaker 
organizing and first contract campaigns, making it more difficult to win on these issues.  
One quarter (27 percent) of the first contracts go beyond these basic work place 
rights to include specific contract language that requires management to treat employees 
with respect and dignity.  While this may appear to be only general language, it is 
significant.  Not only are respect and dignity issues core elements of the most successful 
organizing campaigns, these clauses are also vehemently opposed by employers who see 
such language as an opportunity for the union to file grievances and publicly tarnish 
management’s reputation, even when other contract clauses have not been violated.  
Table 2 also documents how discipline and discharge are handled in first 
agreements.  In a significant departure from the non-union employment-at-will 
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environment, nearly three quarters (70 percent) of the contracts we examined require that 
discipline and discharge must be based on just cause.  Just cause protections strike at the 
heart of management control, by severely constraining their ability to either play favorites 
or intimidate and threaten those workers who challenge them. 
While less common, one quarter (27 percent) of the contracts add an additional 
requirement to just cause, specifying a requirement and/or outlining a process for 
progressive discipline.  This provision constrains the employer from going outside of the 
established procedure, but it may also give the union less flexibility in arguing discipline 
down to a lower level.  Because progressive discipline is considered by arbitrators to be a 
required element of just cause – even when not specified in the contract – some union 
negotiators may be hesitant to include specific wording. 
A sizable number (39 percent) of first contractss also provide for union 
representation (called Weingarten rights) when union members believe that they will be 
disciplined.  These protections have been long guaranteed to unionized workers by law.  
However, having the language in the contract serves both to educate members about this 
right and to provide a more efficient procedure than the labor board process to enforce 
these vital representation rights.  Thirteen percent of all contracts expand upon 
Weingarten rights, requiring the employer to notify the employee of their right to union 
representation before the disciplinary meeting begins. 
Finally, as we see in Table 2, virtually all the contracts in our sample (96 percent) 
create a grievance procedure with third party arbitration.  Employers, who, before the 
first contract was settled, retained sole authority to make decisions in the workplace, 
become bound by a system that allows for independent third party review of disputes 
between management and employees.  This due process language is the most widespread 
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provision in this study, and, except where specifically waived, it is the enforcement 
mechanism that guarantees all the other clauses in the first agreement.  A quarter of the 
contracts extend grievance and arbitration rights even further, permitting class action 
suits where the remedies can be applied to all those affected by the violation. 
 
Union Restrictions on Management Rights 
 In addition to these basic rights, first contracts contain language outlining a 
system of rational and equitable rules and procedures for workplace practices.  As Table 
3 illustrates, it is through these rules and procedures that unionized workers place a web 
of restrictions on unilateral management power and authority, bringing fairness, 
openness, consistency, and control to a system of labor relations that, outside of the union 
workplace, is fraught with favoritism, unpredictability, concealment, and inequity. 
Although seniority is important in both sectors, it is less a feature in public sector 
contracts, in part because it is a central feature of the civil service laws that apply to many 
public sector workers.  Thus seniority is used as a basis for layoff in 84 percent of the 
private sector but only 65 percent of the public sector cases.  These differences are even 
greater in areas such as recall (75 percent private, 37 percent public), promotions (65 
percent private, 27 percent public), vacation scheduling (49 percent private, 21 percent 
public), transfer (37 percent private and 16 percent public), and distribution of overtime 
(29 percent private, 11 percent public).  In both sectors, seniority protections for part-time 
workers are much weaker than those for full-time workers. 
Forty-two percent of first contracts provide for notice in the event of a long-term 
layoff, with private sector employers providing, on average, 9.9 days notice compared to 
23.7 days notice in the public sector.  More than three quarters of contracts in both 
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sectors provide for recall rights, while almost one half  (46 percent) provide for bumping 
rights.  Few contracts, however, provide for retraining or severance pay. 
It is important to note that none of the seniority clauses in these first contracts in 
our sample include affirmative action language to protect women and workers of color 
from being “last hired, first fired” in workplaces where there had been past race and sex 
discrimination in the hiring process.  This is a sensitive issue for the labor movement, 
which will become even more important as women and workers of color continue to 
make up the majority of new workers organized.  
The first contracts we examined also contain language laying out the process for 
promotions and the filling of vacancies that goes beyond basic seniority rights.  As we 
can see from Table 3, more than three quarters (80 percent) of agreements in both sectors 
provide for the posting of vacancies.  In forty percent of the contracts internal candidates 
are given priority in hiring.  More than one third of the contracts (37 percent) provide for 
provisional transfer to newly posted positions.  However, very few contracts (10 percent 
of units where part-timers make up at least 25 percent of the unit) provide opportunities 
for part-time employees to bid on full-time work. 
Thirty eight percent of the contracts go beyond state and federal wage and hour 
laws to require overtime pay after eight hours and 6 percent provide for overtime for 
work beyond an employee’s regularly scheduled hours.  This is particularly important for 
part-time workers, who are frequently asked to work additional hours, but not enough to 
reach the legislated threshold of forty hours a week.  
While expanded overtime hours and more frequent use of mandatory overtime are 
an increasing problem in today’s workplaces, virtually none of the contracts prohibit 
mandatory overtime (2 percent) or set limits on mandatory overtime (5 percent), and only 
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3 percent provide premium pay (double time and a half) for work more than twelve hours 
a day or work weeks longer than six days.  These provisions mirror what is happening in 
contract negotiations in general, where even after long strikes few unions have succeeded 
in eliminating twelve hour days or putting significant limitations on mandatory overtime.  
 A number of contracts in our sample, particularly those in the private sector where 
weekend and evening shifts are more common, have clauses that both codify and/or 
expand upon shift differentials (supplemental pay) for those employees who work outside 
of the regular workday or workweek.  Nearly one half (49 percent) of private sector first 
contracts establish a shift differential for evening work.  Twenty-seven percent and 16 
percent, respectively, establish differentials for Sunday and Saturday work.  
Thirty-three percent of the private sector contracts and 51 percent of the public 
sector contracts also have language outlining work schedules and hours of work and, in 
many cases, notice of or protection from changes outside workers’ regularly scheduled 
hours.  These clauses are important, both because they grant workers predictability and 
control over their work schedules, and because they guarantee in writing non-verbal 
agreements, such as no weekend or night work, that, absent a union contract, are difficult 
to enforce.  Twenty-two percent of the contracts also provide language requiring that 
schedules be posted, making it much more difficult for employers to make sudden 
changes or special deals regarding already agreed upon schedules.  
More than a third of the contracts provide relief by assuring the higher 
classification when workers are asked to cover work at a higher grade or cover for a 
supervisor.  This language is important because it restrains employers from cheating 
workers out of pay due them when they are doing work above their assigned grade.  It 
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also discourages the employer from having workers do non-bargaining unit work, adding 
additional job duties without upgrading the position, and not filling vacancies. 
Workload and minimum staffing, serious issues in almost every workplace, public 
or private, service or manufacturing, are addressed in only 7 percent of first agreements.  
This reflects the fact that most employers aggressively oppose any inclusion of staff and 
work load protections in the contract, frequently arguing that these are absolute 
management rights and therefore permissive subjects of bargaining.  
 Health and safety, often one of the key issues driving workers to organize, is 
another area that dramatically distinguishes union from non-union workplaces.  Forty-
two percent of all contracts, and 55 percent of private sector contracts have grievable 
health and safety clauses.  Thirty-one percent include language requiring employers to 
provide protective equipment, and 30 percent establish a joint health and safety 
committee.  A much smaller number of contracts give the workers the right to refuse 
unsafe work (6 percent), or guarantee workers and unions the right to health and safety 
information, both items which employers aggressively oppose.  At the same time, only 4 
percent of the first contracts include language more common to the non-union sector, 
putting the burden on the employee to report health and safety problems to the employer. 
Today, probably the most difficult challenge facing American workers and their 
unions is protecting job security from a constantly changing economic environment, 
including global trade and investment policies and the resultant rapid increase in capital 
mobility, changes in corporate ownership and structure, technological change, new work 
systems, bankruptcies, privatization, downsizing, and contracting out. 
Table 3 suggests that first contracts, particularly those in the private sector, reflect 
only modest gains in union control over these important issues.  Among private sector 
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first agreements, approximately one third include some language governing restrictions 
on supervisors doing bargaining unit work (35 percent), successorship (32 percent), 
restricting the use of temporary workers (27 percent), and subcontracting (27 percent).  
Much less common are provisions relating to new owners’ honoring of the agreement (7 
percent), union notification of closure (6 percent), and technological change (9 percent). 
 
Union Rights and Practices Under First Contracts 
 
Table 4 presents data on how union rights and practices become codified and 
institutionalized after the signing of an initial union agreement.  In the private sector 
almost two thirds (61 percent) of the first contracts establish union shops, and 74 percent 
require either a union or an agency shop.  Only 22 percent of the private sector contracts 
are open shops, and 91 percent of those are in right-to-work states where open shops are 
the only option.  In the public sector, only 5 percent are union shops, 48 percent are 
agency shops, and 16 percent are open shops, 69 percent of which are in right-to-work 
states.  In total, nearly two thirds of all the first contracts in our sample have an agency or 
union shop, thereby laying a foundation upon which the union can more easily establish 
and maintain its presence in the workplace.  
Union security is further strengthened in the three quarters (73 percent) of the first 
contracts that allow for dues check off – where union dues and/or agency fees are 
automatically deducted from workers’ paychecks.  This provides a regular and steady 
flow of dues dollars for union administration and, in combination with union and agency 
shops, removes the employers’ power to intimidate, threaten, and penalize those workers 
who do become union members and pay their dues. 
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Another essential element of union representation is language guaranteeing staff 
and officers access to the workplace and to bargaining unit members.  Fewer than half 
(45 percent) of private sector first contracts have liberal union access policies allowing 
union representatives to meet with employees in the workplace without having prior 
authorization from the employer or being restricted to certain times and certain areas.  
Twenty-nine percent have restricted access, limiting where, when, and/or under whose 
authorization representatives have access to the workplace.  Twenty percent of the private 
sector contracts do not include any union access language.  In the public sector, fewer 
than half of all the contracts have any union access language, mostly likely because a 
combination of open meeting and public access laws provide union representatives, as 
members of the public, equal access to any public areas or public meetings.  
More than 80 percent of the first contracts in both sectors guarantee access to 
union bulletin boards to post union notices and other information.  However, only 10 
percent of contracts include language requiring access to information necessary to 
represent their membership.  While this right is already provided under the NLRA, and 
most public sector information is publicly available, that right is stronger when specified 
in the contract because it can then be grieved. 
The rights of the union’s frontline representatives, stewards and rank-and-file 
officers, are critical to building a lasting institutional presence in the workplace.  The 
more contract language they have expanding their rights to actively and aggressively 
represent their members, the stronger the union.  As described in Table 4, nearly one half 
(45 percent) of all first contracts provide stewards release time to investigate grievances, 
although it is more prevalent in the private sector (56 percent) than in the public sector 
(31 percent).  Overall, approximately one-third (32 percent) grant stewards paid release 
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time to investigate grievances on company time.  Fifty-eight percent of first contracts 
grant stewards release time for grievance processing, with almost one half (47 percent) 
allowing this to take place on paid company time.  Other than grievances, only a quarter 
of the contracts in our sample provide for paid release time for other meetings with 
management and only 11 percent of private sector contracts and 1 percent of public sector 
contracts provide paid release time for members to participate in the grievance process as 
either grievants or witnesses.  Fewer than 10 percent of the contracts in both sectors have 
contract language authorizing rank-and-file representatives to orient new members.  
Although such language is of critical importance in any agreement, it is especially 
important in newly organized workplaces, where everyone is new to the union.  
Only a few of the contracts in our sample (9 percent) provide for union leave for 
officers to conduct union business outside the workplace, while 19 percent provide for 
union leave to take higher union office, protecting the right to return to work once the 
employee is no longer in office.  A larger percentage (37 percent) of the contracts provide 
for union leave for officers and 25 percent provide union leave for members to attend 
union meetings and conventions.  Paid union leave for officers to attend meetings and 
conferences is only included in 17 percent of the agreements, while similar paid leave for 
members is only found in 10 percent of the agreements. 
 
Benefits in Newly Organized Workplaces 
 Table 5 summarizes the workplace benefits provided by the first contracts in our 
sample.  Health insurance, pension plans, leaves of absence, pay systems, training, and 
continuing education are fundamental concerns for unorganized workers, and are areas 
which have shown a substantial differential between union and non-union workplaces 
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(AFL-CIO, 2002).  Beyond the basic rights, fair and equitable standards, and institutional 
presence already discussed, these workplace benefits are part of creating and protecting a 
quality of life for workers and their families.  The extent and nature of these contract 
clauses also inform us about the kinds of human resources practices in operation in newly 
organized workplaces. 
 Overall, 89 percent of the first contracts in our sample provide some form of 
health insurance.  Reflecting the spiraling costs of healthcare, relatively few (10 percent) 
provide fully paid health insurance for workers and dependents.  Another 7 percent 
provide full insurance only for individuals while 14 percent provide full coverage for the 
individual but only partial coverage for dependents.  Less than 1 percent of the employers 
make contributions to union health and welfare plans.  This is a significant departure 
from union contracts a generation ago, when many newly organized workers were 
brought into a master or pattern agreement with fully paid family health insurance and 
fully funded union health and welfare plans.   
 In addition to basic health insurance, dental insurance is provided in one half (51 
percent) of agreements, with vision (10 percent) and drug benefits (13 percent) 
considerably less common.  Disability insurance coverage is also limited, with short-term 
disability insurance provided in only 22 percent of first contracts and long-term disability 
provided in 18 percent.  Sixty-one percent of the contracts provide for basic life insurance 
while 31 percent codify the state requirements for worker compensation.  
Pension plans are provided for in only 39 percent of first agreements, with 
employer-sponsored saving plans offered in an additional 12 percent and retiree health 
benefits offered in only 8 percent.  Here, too, we see a significant departure from the 
kinds of retirement benefits that once were a common element of large industrial and 
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public sector agreements reflecting, in part, the growing efforts by US employers to cut 
costs and long-term liabilities by shifting to a more contingent and less costly workforce.  
Nearly three quarters (70 percent) of the first contracts in our sample provide for 
some sick leave benefits.  As would be expected, given the high percentage of elementary 
and secondary school units among the public sector contracts, sick leave benefits are 
much more common in the public sector (89 percent overall and 88 percent paid) than in 
the private sector (53 percent overall and 39 percent paid).  In the public sector the 
average number of sick days for new employees (10 days) is more than double the 
number of days for new employees in the private sector (4 days) and 72 percent have at 
least ten sick days per year compared to only 15 percent in the private sector.  However, 
sick leave benefits are much more likely to be pro-rated for part-time workers in private 
sector units where part-time workers are at least 25 percent of the unit (44 percent), than 
in public sector units (17 percent).  In approximately one third of contracts, sick leave 
may be taken for sick children and other sick dependents, while sick banks are provided 
for in almost one half (48 percent) of the first contracts in our sample. 
Unlike sick leave, vacation and holiday benefits are slightly less common in the 
public sector than the private sector, partly because most public sector holidays are set by 
law and, for public school employees, vacations are often taken outside of the nine-month 
employment period.  Seventy-two percent of private sector contracts provide at least five 
paid holidays and 83 percent provide at least one week vacation, while a minimum of five 
paid holidays is found in only 42 percent of public sector contracts, and only 62 percent 
of public sector contracts provide at least one weeks vacation. Vacation benefits were 
pro-rated for 44 percent and holiday benefits were pro-rated for 28 percent of private 
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sector units with at least 25 percent part-time employees, compared to only 13 percent for 
vacation benefits and 8 percent for holiday benefits in public sector units. 
 A variety of other leaves are provided for in first contracts as well, with jury leave 
(81 percent), bereavement leave (78 percent), military leave (61 percent), personal leave 
of absence (65 percent), and disability leave (43 percent) the most common, and parental 
leave (29 percent) and education leave (15 percent) considerably less frequent. 
 Table 5 also presents data on the kinds of pay systems established by first 
contracts.  Almost two thirds (61 percent) of agreements provide for step systems.  Given 
the arbitrariness of most non-union pay systems that frequently involve wages being 
negotiated on a person-by-person basis, step systems are a significant accomplishment.  
In contrast, only 2 percent of the contracts had merit pay systems, which are the systems 
that dominate the non-union environment.  At the same time, cost of living adjustments 
(COLA) are provided in only 2 percent of first contracts.  
Training benefits are much more limited, with only one quarter (23 percent) of 
agreements specifying job training or in-service training provided for by the employer.  
Continuing education is provided in only 17 percent of agreements, while tuition 
reimbursement is covered in only 26 percent. 
Finally, employee involvement clauses were included in 28 percent of the first 
contracts we examined.  However, most of these clauses lack union protections.  Only 15 
percent specify an equal number of union and management representatives on the 
committee, and only 5 percent specifically prohibit the discussion of contractual issues.  
Particularly with the growing management interest in joint programs, unions clearly need 
to bargain language which ensures that these programs are indeed joint and do not 
undermine the union or the contract. 
Significant Victories -18 
Conclusions:  Better First Contracts, More Effective Unions  
 As we have seen, first contracts constitute significant victories for workers and 
their unions.  These contracts provide important basic rights that go far beyond 
employment at will and institute a grievance procedure that allows for the enforcement of 
these rights.  They also contain important restrictions on management rights, substituting 
seniority and equitable systems for the assignment of work, promotions, and layoffs, for 
arbitrary employer control.  In addition, they establish an institutional presence for the 
union and the rank-and-file leadership in the workplace.  Finally, first contracts establish 
health insurance, pensions, and substantial paid leave benefits. 
While contracts vary widely and unions are more successful in some areas than 
others, clearly these contracts provide the foundation for a fundamentally different 
employment relationship than that which existed prior to the union organizing campaign.  
We must remember that these agreements are only the first in what typically become 
stronger agreements over time.  The establishment of a grievance system, just cause, 
union access, and stewards’ rights is an enormous accomplishment for workers and 
unions confronting employers who had for decades clung to their absolute “right to 
manage,” and fought the union organizing effort with everything they could.  Even if less 
than comprehensive, these agreements make significant inroads into management 
prerogatives and, in future negotiations, leave room to strengthen and expand these 
inroads into management control.   
In order to assess just how comprehensive these first contracts are, we also 
examined whether and how these individual provisions do or do not cluster together.  The 
findings suggest that, while many contracts include significant contract provisions, 
relatively few contracts include what we would consider a core set of provisions.  For 
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example, only 24 cases, or 14 percent of our sample, contained all six of what we 
consider the fundamental elements of a strong first contract−anti-discrimination clauses, 
grievance and arbitration, steward rights in investigating and processing grievances, 
union access, and seniority for layoff.3  Clearly, these data suggest that, while unions 
have made important strides in first contracts, considerably more work needs to be done 
to achieve strong basic agreements.   
 We need to recognize that good contracts, like successful organizing, don’t just 
happen.  As previous research shows, given the almost rabid employer opposition to 
union organizing efforts that has become a permanent feature of the American industrial 
relations environment, unions can win first contracts only when they utilize a 
comprehensive, multifaceted, union-building strategy throughout the organizing and first 
contract process (Bronfenbrenner, 1996; Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2002).  Indeed, a 
cursory analysis of the data here suggest that, in those units where the union runs a 
moderately aggressive organizing campaign, the likelihood that any of the six core 
elements will be included in a first contract rises between 5 to 20 percentage points.  
Clearly, more aggressive and strategic organizing and first contract campaigns not only 
increases the probability of winning the organizing campaign and settling the first 
contract, but also improves the quality and the strength of the first contracts themselves. 
As Bronfenbrenner’s data on union behavior in first contract campaigns has 
shown (1996), at the very point the union needs to take the campaign, and the newly 
organized workers, to the next level, the organizing activity stops and much of the 
                                                 
3 These six fundamentals are defined as follows: race and gender discrimination plus at least one of the 
following anti-discrimination clauses: union activity, age, sexual harassment, sexual orientation, family 
status, handicap, or national origin; just cause; steward release time to investigate and process grievances 
(paid or unpaid); at least some union access (liberal or restricted); and seniority for layoffs. 
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union’s power in the workplace and the broader community to bring the employer to the 
table and bargain a strong agreement is lost.  
Clearly more energy and attention need to be devoted to developing and 
implementing more comprehensive and strategic first contract campaigns.  But even that 
is not enough if unions fail to set bargaining the best first contract possible as their goal, 
rather than just the minimum of reaching any first agreement.  In addition to running 
more aggressive first contract campaigns, unions need to work together to share hallmark 
first contract language and to explore creative avenues to rise to the highest common 
denominator.  One of the discouraging findings of this research was just how few 
contracts contained language addressing job loss, staffing, mandatory overtime, 
technological change, contracting out, privatization, and plant closing – some of the most 
crucial issues facing workers in the global economy.  While these are difficult issues to 
take on even in mature bargaining relationships, unions need to begin addressing these 
issues, no matter how basic, in first agreements. 
 It is also important to recognize that the language provided for in first agreements 
is simply that – language – until and unless the union does what it takes to implement and 
enforce what they have negotiated in the agreement.  Anti-discrimination language is 
worthless if members of a local union are too intimidated to file and follow through on 
grievances, or the local leadership fails to take discrimination violations seriously.  
Seniority and bidding language are meaningless if the union turns a blind eye when less 
senior workers are moved into higher paying jobs.  Stewards’ rights or Weingarten 
language has no effect if unions fail to elect and train stewards and fight for the 
information, release time, and access that they bargained for. 
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 While we have not gathered data on the operation and effectiveness of the local 
unions where these first contracts were negotiated, we would suggest that the shape and 
scope of the organizing and first contract campaign is a major predictor of a local’s 
ability to use and enforce a first contract to its fullest.  For example, campaigns that rely 
primarily on staff, and passive forms of communication such as leaflets and mailings, 
will tend, at least initially, to create relatively weak local unions.  On the other hand, 
campaigns that develop and utilize representative rank-and-file leadership and start acting 
like a union long before the first contract is reached, are much more likely to already 
have in place the leadership structure and membership involvement necessary to make 
the most of the first contract language they negotiated.  Weak organizing and first 
contract campaigns not only lead to weaker first contract language, but to less capacity to 
utilize and enforce that language once the first contract is won. 
 This research does not diminish the accomplishments, the significant victories 
that the first contracts we studied represent.  Rather it reminds us of the promise and 
potential for strong first contracts and the strong unions that go with them.  Workers risk 
so much to bring a union into their workplace, it is imperative that the labor movement 
do everything in its power to ensure that the contracts they achieve, and the unions they 
build, make those risks worthwhile.  
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 Table 1: Characteristics of the Sample 
All contracts Private Sector Public Sector 
 Number 
Mean or 
Proportion Number 
Mean or 
Proportion Number 
Mean or 
Proportion 
Number of contracts 175 1.00 94 .54 81 .46 
Duration of contract       
  Average number of months -- 28.5 -- 30.3 -- 26.3 
Signatories       
       Local 144 .82 82 .87 62 .78 
  Regional/district 4 .02 2 .02 2 .03 
  International 3 .02 2 .02 1 .01 
Unit Scope       
  All employees 25 .14 11 .12 14 .17 
  Regular full-time employees only 19 .11 15 .16 4 .05 
  Regular full-time and all part-time employees 63 .36 37 .39 26 .32 
  Regular full-time plus some part-time  35 .20 22 .23 13 .16 
  Part-time, per-diem, and/or temporary 5 .03 1 .01 4 .05 
Workers covered under contracts       
      Number of workers covered 27,651 159 11,453 123 16,198 200 
Unit type       
Blue collar 36 .21 37 .39 8 .10 
White collar 10 .06 4 .04 6 .07 
Professional/technical 21 .12 7 .07 14 .17 
Service and maintenance 54 .31 19 .20 35 .43 
Wall-to-wall 26 .15 15 .16 11 .14 
Other 18 .10 11 .12 7 .09 
Industry       
Manufacturing 30 .17 30 .32 0 -- 
Communications 2 .01 2 .02 0 -- 
Construction 2 .01 2 .02 0 -- 
Food processing 1 .01 1 .01 0 -- 
Printing 1 .01 1 .01 0 -- 
Retail 5 .03 5 .05 0 -- 
Transportation 5 .03 5 .05 0 -- 
Utility 3 .02 3 .03 0 -- 
Warehouse 1 .01 1 .01 0 -- 
Health care (both public and private) 31 .18 29 .31 2 .03 
Social services 5 .03 5 .05 0 -- 
Other services 8 .05 8 .09 0 -- 
City/county government 36 .21 0 -- 36 .44 
Public education (schools and universities) 43 .25 0 -- 43 .53 
Bargaining unit demographics       
       At least 50 percent workers of color 47 .33 44 .47 13 .16 
      No workers of color in the unit 37 .21 12 .13 25 .31 
      Proportion of workers of color in the unit -- .31 -- .43 -- .18 
At least 50 percent women workers 84 .59 38 .40 66 .82 
      No women workers 10 .06 10 .11 0 -- 
      Proportion women workers in unit -- .52 -- .38 -- .67 
At least 25 percent part-time workers 42 .24 18 .19 24 .30 
    No part time workers 91 .52 49 .52 35 .43 
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Table 2: Workplace Rights Provided by First Contracts 
All contracts Private Sector Public Sector  
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Anti-Discrimination Protections 128 .73 80 .85 48 .59 
     Union activity 101 .58 51 .54 50 .62 
     Race* 123 .70 (.73) 75 .80 (.78) 48 .59 (.62) 
     Gender** 122 .70 (.63) 74 .79 (.74) 48 .59 (.54) 
     Age 112 .64 66 .70 46 .57 
     Disability 92 .53 52 .55 40 .49 
     National origin 118 .67 72 .77 46 .57 
     Family status 8 .05 2 .02 6 .07 
     Marital status 48 .27 17 .18 31 .38 
     Sexual orientation 31 .18 19 .20 12 .15 
     Political affiliation 38 .22 14 .15 24 .30 
     Religion 115 .66 68 .72 47 .58 
     Veteran status 26 .15 20 .21 6 .07 
     Separate sexual harassment clause 10 .06 5 .05 5 .06 
     Pay equity 2 .01 1 .01 1 .01 
     Compliance with all state, local, and federal laws 9 .05 9 .10 0 -- 
Respect and Dignity Clause 29 .17 25 .27 4 .05 
Discipline and Discharge       
     Just cause 122 .70 67 .71 55 .68 
     Specified progressive discipline procedure 48 .27 19 .20 29 .36 
     Grievable Weingarten rights (Notification) 22 .15 14 .15 8 .10 
     Grievable Weingarten rights (No notification) 42 .24 16 .17 26 .32 
Grievance Procedure       
     Grievance procedure with 3rd party arbitration 168 .96 93 .99 75 .93 
     Expedited grievance procedures 50 .29 25 .27 25 .31 
     Class action grievances permitted 47 .27 11 .12 36 .44 
*Numbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with 25% or more workers of color that have race discrimination language. 
**Numbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with 25% or more women workers that have gender discrimination language.
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Table 3: Union Restrictions on Management Rights 
All contracts Private Sector Public Sector  
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Seniority       
     Overtime 36 .21 27 .29 9 .11 
     Layoff 132 .75 79 .84 53 .65 
     Recall 116 .66 70 .75 46 .37 
     Transfer 48 .27 35 .37 13 .16 
     Promotions where minimum qualifications are met 16 .09 10 .11 6 .07 
     Promotions where equally qualified 72 .41 51 .54 21 .26 
     Shift assignments 10 .06 6 .06 4 .05 
     Holidays 3 .02 3 .03 0 -- 
     Vacation 63 .36 46 .49 17 .21 
     Prorated for part-time employees* 18  .10 (.07) 7 .07 (.11) 11 .14 (.04) 
     Full seniority for part-time employees*  7 .04 (.05) 4 .04 (.06) 3 .04 (.04) 
Layoffs or Reduction of Hours       
     Long-term layoff notice 74 .42 41 .44 31 .41 
Average minimum number of days notice -- 17 -- 9.9 -- 23.7 
     Short-term layoff without seniority consideration 9 .05 8 .09 1 .01 
     Bumping rights 81 .46 46 .49 35 .43 
     Severance pay 7 .04 6 .06 1 .01 
     Retraining 4 .02 4 .04 0 -- 
     Recall rights 142 .81 82 .87 60 .74 
Promotions and Filling of Vacancies       
     Posting of vacancies 140 .80 75 .80 65 .80 
     Internal candidates first priority 70 .40 40 .43 30 .37 
     Opportunity of temporary trial/return 65 .37 42 .45 23 .28 
     Part-timers can bid for full-time* 7 .04 (.10) 5 .05 (.11) 2 .03 (.08) 
Overtime       
     Overtime for over regularly scheduled hours 10 .06 6 .06 4 .05 
     Overtime pay for over forty hours per week 24 .19 22 .23 2 .03 
     Overtime pay for over eight hours 67 .38 43 .46 24 .30 
     Overtime equalization 32 .18 21 .22 11 .14 
     No mandatory overtime 3 .02 0 -- 3 .04 
     Limits on mandatory overtime 9 .05 8 .09 1 .01 
     Premium pay for over 12 hours work 6 .03 6 .06 0 -- 
     Premium pay for over six days a week 4 .02 3 .03 1 .01 
Shift and other pay differentials       
     Evening differential 60 .34 46 .49 14 .17 
     Saturday differential 24 .14 15 .16 9 .11 
     Sunday differential 35 .20 25 .27 10 .12 
     Relief in higher classification 63 .36 33 .35 30 .37 
  Schedules, hours of work, and minimum staff/workload       
     Hours and scheduling specified in the contract 72 .41 31 .33 41 .51 
     Posting of schedules required 39 .22 29 .31 10 .12 
     Minimum staffing/workload 13 .07 8 .09 5 .06 
Health and Safety       
     Right to refuse unsafe work 10 .06 7 .07 3 .04 
     Employer provided protective equipment 54 .31 33 .35 21 .26 
     Health and safety committee 52 .30 36 .38 16 .20 
     Right to information 8 .05 7 .07 1 .01 
     Grievable health and safety language 73 .42 52 .55 21 .26 
     Employees will alert employer of safety concerns 7 .04 5 .05 2 .03 
Job security and protecting bargaining unit work       
     Subcontracting rules 40 .23 21 .22 19 .24 
     Restrictions on the use of temporary workers 28 .16 25 .27 3 .04 
     Restrictions on supervisors doing bargaining unit work 41 .23 33 .35 8 .10 
     Successorship language 35 .20 30 .32 5 .06 
        Purchaser must honor contract 11 .06 7 .07  4 .05 
        Union notified, request purchaser to honor agreement 6 .03 6 .06  0 -- 
    New technology language 8 .05 8 .09 0 -- 
*Numbers in parentheses report the proportion of units with at least 25 percent part-time workers
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Table 4: Union Practice After First Contracts 
All Contracts Private Sector Public Sector  
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Type of shop       
      Union 61 .35 57 .61 4 .05 
  Agency 51 .29 12 .13 39 .48 
  Open 34 .19 21 .22 13 .16 
  Proportion of open shops in right-to-work states 28 .82 19 .91 9 .69 
 Dues check-off 128 .73 67 .71 61 .75 
Union staff access to workplace       
  Liberal 62 .35 42 .45 20 .25 
  Restricted 50 .29 33 .35 17 .21 
  No access specified in contract 63 .36 19 .20 44 .54 
Union Access       
     Union bulletin board for union postings 142 .81 82 .87 60 .74 
     Union right to information  17 .10 12 .13 5 .06 
Officer/Steward Rights       
     Stewards’ time to investigate grievances 78 .45 53 .56 25 .31 
    Paid release time to investigate grievances 56 .32 32 .34 24 .30 
     Stewards’ time to process grievances 102 .58 62 .66 40 .49 
     Paid release time to process grievances 83 .47 44 .47 39 .48 
     Paid release time for other meetings with management 44 .25 13 .14 31 .38 
     Union orientation 14 .08 8 .07 7 .09 
     Union leave for officers to conduct union business 15 .09 6 .06 9 .11 
     Union leave for officers to attend meetings/conventions 64 .37 28 .30 36 .42 
   Paid union leave to attend meetings/conventions 29 .17 5 .05 24 .30 
     Unpaid leave for officers to take higher office 33 .19 22 .23 11 .14 
     Paid leave for members to process grievances 11 .06 10 .11 1 .01 
     Union leave for members to attend meetings/conventions 43 .25 21 .22 22 .27 
    Paid leave to attend meetings/conventions 18 .10 3 .03 15 .19 
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Table 5: Benefits in Newly Organized Workplaces 
All contracts Private Sector Public Sector  
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Number Mean or 
Proportion 
Health and Other Insurance       
     Health insurance 156 .89 85 .90 71 .88 
        Full individual only 12 .07 8 .09 4 .05 
        Full individual plus full family 17 .10 4 .04 13 .16 
        Full individual and part family 24 .14 14 .15 10 .12 
     Dental insurance 90 .51 45 .48 45 .56 
     Short-term disability 38 .22 27 .29 11 .14 
     Long-term disability 21 .18 14 .15 17 .21 
     Employer contribute to union health and welfare plan 11 .06 8 .09 3 .04 
     Life insurance 106 .61 59 .63 47 .58 
     Vision insurance 18 .10 6 .06 12 .15 
     Drug insurance 22 .13 8 .09 14 .17 
     Workers Compensation provision 55 .31 24 .26 31 .38 
Retirement benefits       
     Pension plan 68 .39 36 .38 32 .40 
     Employer-sponsored savings plan 21 .12 20 .21 1 .01 
     Retirement health plan 14 .08 5 .05 9 .11 
Leaves of Absence       
Sick leave 122 .70 50 .53 72 .89 
    At least ten sick days a year 72 .41 14 .15 58 .72 
    Average number of days veteran employees -- 11.61 -- 9.71 -- 12.44 
    Prorated for part-time workers* 43 .25 (.29) 21 .22 (.44) 22 .27 (.17) 
    Apply to sick children 63 .36 13 .14 50 .61 
        Apply to other sick dependents 57 .33 9 .10 48 .59 
     Sick bank 84 .48 27 .29 51 .70 
Vacation 132 .75 82 .87 50 .62 
    At least one week vacation shutdown a year 128 .73 78 .83 .50 .62 
    Average number of days new employees -- 6.60 -- 6.60 -- 6.59 
    Average number of days veteran employees -- 19.84 -- 18.53 -- 22.02 
    Prorated for part-time workers* 47 .27 (.26) 31 .33 (.44) 16 .20(.13) 
    Mandatory vacation for plant shutdown 9 .05 9 .10  0 0 
Holidays  152 .87 92 .98 60 .74 
    At least five holidays a year 102 .58 68 .72 34 .42 
    Average number of days new employees -- 7.83 -- 7.89 -- 7.77 
    Average number of days veteran employees -- 10.52 -- 9.44 -- 11.33 
    Prorated for part-time workers* 33 .19 (.17) 16 .17 (.28) 17 .21(.08) 
    Premium pay 106 .61 71 .76 35 .43 
Parental leave 50   .29 9 .10 41 .51 
Bereavement leave 137 .78 80 .85 57 .70 
     Education leave 27 .15 11 .12 16 .20 
     Medical/disability leave 76 .43 48 .51 28 .35 
Personal leave of absence 114 .65 65 .69 49 .61 
     Military leave 106 .61 54 .57 52 .64 
     Jury leave 142 .81 76 .81 66 .82 
 Pay system       
Step 106 .61 57 .61 48 .61 
Merit 3 .02 1 .01 2 .03 
Combination of step and merit 5 .03 4 .04 1 .01 
COLA step 13 .02 0 -- 3 .04 
Rate set in contract, not necessarily step 48 .27 30 .32 18 .22 
Regular bonuses granted 15 .09 11 .12 4 .05 
Profit or gain-sharing 5 .03 5 .05 0 -- 
Training       
     Job training/in-service training paid by employer 40 .23 19 .20 21 .26 
     Continuing education 30 .17 9 .10 21 .26 
     Tuition paid 45 .26 15 .16 30 .37 
     Tuition for children/spouse 5 .03 0 -- 5 .06 
Employee Involvement        
     Labor/management committee 49 .28 25 .27 24 .30 
        Equal number of union and management 27 .15 13 .14 14 .17 (.58) 
        No discussion of contractual issues 9 .05 8 .09 1 .01 (.04) 
     Service/product quality committee 5 .03 4 .04 1 .01 
     Drug insurance 22 .13 8 .09 14 .17 
     Workers compensation provision 55 .31 24 .26 31 .38 
*Numbers in parentheses represent proportion of units with at least 25 percent part time workers. 
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